The Representation of Time
Husserl , Edmund. 2008. On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (18931917). Translated by John Barnett Brough. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Grush, Rick. 2006. ‚How to, and how not to, Bridge Computational Cognitive Neuroscience and Husserlian Phenomenology of Time Consciousness.Synthese. 153(3): 417-450
Abstract: A number of recent attempts to bridge Husserlian phenomenology of time consciousness and contemporary tools and results from cognitive science or computational neuroscience are described and critiqued. An alternate proposal is outlined that lacks the weaknesses of existing accounts.
Dennett, Daniel C. and Marcel Kinsbourne. 1992. ‚Time and the Observer: The Where and When of Consciousness in the Brain. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15: 183-201.
Abstract: Two models of consciousness are contrasted with regard to their treatment of subjective timing. The standard Cartesian Theater model postulates a place in the brain where "it all comes together": where the discriminations in all modalities are somehow put into registration and "presented" for subjective judgment. In particular, the Cartesian Theater model implies that the temporal properties of the content-bearing events occurring within this privileged representational medium determine subjective order. The alternative, Multiple Drafts model holds that whereas the brain events that discriminate various perceptual contents are distributed in both space and time in the brain, and whereas the temporal properties of these various events are determinate, none of these temporal properties determine subjective order, since there is no single, constitutive "stream of consciousness" but rather a parallel stream of conflicting and continuously revised contents. Four puzzling phenomena that resist explanation by the standard model are analyzed: two results claimed by Libet, an apparent motion phenomenon involving color change (Kolers and von Grunau), and the "cutaneous rabbit" (Geldard and Sherrick) an illusion of evenly spaced series of "hops" produced by two or more widely spaced series of taps delivered to the skin. The unexamined assumptions that have always made the Cartesian Theater model so attractive are exposed and dismantled. The Multiple Drafts model provides a better account of the puzzling phenomena, avoiding the scientific and metaphysical extravagances of the Cartesian Theater.
Zahavi, Dan. 2012. The Time of the Self.Grazer Philosophische Studien, 84 (2012), 143—159.
Abstract: How should one go about understanding the relation between time and self? In the following I will compare and contrast two philosophical conceptions of self that both stress the close connection between selfhood and temporality. Despite this shared conviction they happen to emphasize quite different aspects of self, however, partly because they operate with quite different notions of time. In the first case, the focus is on narrated time and on the link between selfhood and narration, in the second case, it is on the temporal structure of the stream of consciousness.
The Representation of Time in Agency Holly Andersen In Adrian Bardon & Heather Dyke (eds.),Blackwell Companion to Philosophy of Time. Wiley-Blackwell (forthcoming) This paper outlines some key issues that arise when agency and temporality are considered jointly, from the perspective of psychology, cognitive neuroscience, phenomenology, and action theory. I address the difference between time simpliciter and time as represented as it figures in phenomena like intentional binding, goal-oriented action plans, emulation systems, and temporal agency. An examination of Husserl's account of time consciousness highlights difficulties in generalizing his account to include a substantive notion of agency, a weakness inherited by explanatory projects like neurophenomenology. I conclude by sketching a project analogous to the projects in neurophenomenology, based on Thompsons and Noe's action theory.
Le Poidevin, Robin, "The Experience and Perception of Time", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.),
Abstract: Time perception raises a number of intriguing puzzles, including what it means to say we perceive time. In this article, we shall explore the various processes through which we are made aware of time, and which influence the way we think time really is. Inevitably, we shall be concerned with the psychology of time perception, but the purpose of the article is to draw out the philosophical issues, and in particular whether and how aspects of our experience can be accommodated within certain metaphysical theories concerning the nature of time and causation.